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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,3 2 and held that
avoidance of shareholder tax need be only "one" purpose of accumula-
tion for the accumulated earnings tax to apply.3 Because the statutory
language was unclear, the Court turned to the congressional intent.3 4 It
intimated that any other test would be inconsistent with that intentas and
would unduly weaken the presumption of a purpose of avoidance., The
Court stated, "[O]ur holding would [not] make purpose totally irrele-
vant. It still serves to isolate those cases in which tax avoidance motives
did not contribute to the decision to accumulate." .37
On the basis of this decision the accumulated earnings tax, if other-
wise applicable, will be assessed against a corporate taxpayer which
accumulates earnings with "a" purpose of avoiding personal income taxes
regardless of other purposes or motives. As the dissent in Donruss sug-
gests,"' if the jury does not carefully weigh subtleties, then accumula-
tion of earnings together with mere knowledge of the tax savings may
satisfy the "one" purpose quantum requirement of the Supreme Court.
The taxpayer must disprove any tax avoidance purpose.
ROBERT S. PARKER, JR.
Armed Services-THE RIGHT TO PRE-INDUCTION JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Oestereicb v. Selective Service System, 89 S. Ct. 414 (1968).
A divinity student, unconditionally entitled to exemption from mili-
tary service by statute,1 was reclassified as delinquent,2 and subsequently
32. 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cit. 1967)
33. 89 S. Ct. at 504. The Court recognized Young as a strong case in the taxpayer's
favor, but rejected it.
34. Id. at 504-07.
35. Id. at 505.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id. at 508.
38. Id. at 508-10.
1. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(g), 62 Stat. 611
(now Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App., § 456(g) (1967)). This
provision grants students enrolled in a theological school an exemption from training
and service.
2. Plaintiff returned his registration certificate to the Government in expressing
his dissent from United States participation in the Vietnam war. Every person must
have his registration certificate in his possession at all times. 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1968).
The local Selective Service board has the authority to declare a registrant to be
delinquent whenever he fails to perform any duty required of him, apart from
the duty to obey an order to report for induction. 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1968).
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ordered to report for induction. A suit to enjoin his induction was
dismissed by the district court3 which found that under the applicable
statute4 judicial review prior to induction was beyond its jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted the
registrant's petition for a writ of certiorari.6
The Supreme Court found no reasonable relationship between the
denial of a valid statutory exemption and the conduct of a registrant.7
In reaching its decision, the Court assumed that the legislative intent
was not to enlarge the scope of authority of local boards at the expense
of a guaranteed statutory right. Consequently, when no determination
of fact is involved, pre-induction judicial review is not precluded when
the local board has clearly exceeded its statutory powers.9
The 1967 Military Selective Service Act1 provides for judicial review
only when certain requirements are satisfied. There must be no basis in
3. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 280 F. Supp. 78 (D. Wyo. 1968).
4. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 10(b) (3), 62
Star. 620 (now Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App., § 460 (b) (3)
(1967)). This provsion defines the limited availability of judicial review to the
registrant:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of
any registrant by the local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except
as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this
title [section 462 of this Appendix], after the registrant has responded
either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction,
or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be opposed
to participation in war in any form: Provided, That such review shall
go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal
boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact for the
classification assigned to such registrant.
5. 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1968). The jurisdictional question was particularly empha-
sized by the court of appeals.
6. 391 U.S. 912 (1968).
7. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 89 S. Ct. 414, 417 (1968).
8. Id. at 416. Plaintiff was not contending that the local board acted with no basis
in fact. The majority opinion stated:
In such instances, as in the present one, there is no exercise of discre-
tion by a Board in evaluating evidence and in determining whether a
claimed exemption is deserved.
9. Id. at 417. The Court defined the special circumstances of the case before granting
pre-induction judicial review:
Since the exemption granted divinity students is plain and unequivocal
and in no way contested here, and since the scope of the statutory de-
linquency concept is not broad enough to sustain a revocation of what
Congress has granted as a statutory right, or sufficiently buttressed by
legislative standards, we conclude that pre-induction judicial review is not
precluded in cases of this type.
10. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 451-73 (1967).
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fact for the board's classification"- and the registrant, having exhausted
all of his administrative remedies, must refuse to submit to induction."
Congress had firmly established the finality of local board classifications
in prior legislation and this policy was continued in the 1967 Act.'3
Review was to be made available, if at all, at the induction stage. The
means for obtaining review were twofold-by a writ of habeas corpus
after induction or by a defense of improper classification in a criminal
prosecution upon refusal of induction."
The courts, however, have taken notice of irregularities and unfair
treatment", and have allowed a registrant redress when a local board has
11. See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Estep limited the scope of
judicial review to whether there was any basis in fact for the classification. Id. at 123.
"The new law codifies the rule that judicial review of a classification is to be
limited to the question whether it had any basis in fact." Note, The New Draft Law:
Its Failures and Future, 19 CASE W. REs. L. Rnv. 292, 301 (1968).
12. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), set the general rule that a registrant
cannot obtain judicial review until he. has exhausted all his administrative remedies.
In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 123 (1946), the registrant had exhausted all
his administrative remedies and the Court held that in such a case a registrant
may obtain judicial review in his criminal prosecution by raising the defense
that the local board exceeded its jurisdiction in classifying him. Accord, Gibson v.
United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946), showing the tendency of the Supreme Court to
broaden the remedies of the registrant. See also Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442
(1947); Layton and Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 56
GEO. L.J. 315, 334 (1967). Layton and Fine observe that "[ulnder the Act, the
final remedy . . . to a registrant . . . is a discretionary appeal to the President."
See Ashton v. United States, 404 F.2d 95, 96 (8th Cir. 1968), where the court states:
"When administrative remedies are not exhausted, exceptional circumstances must
exist for judicial review of the claimed erroneous classification."
13. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, while
allowing for administrative appeals, provided that the classification of registrants by
local boards shall be final. The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1950,
ch. 144, 65 Stat. 75, continued the basic provisions of the 1940 Act, and allowed a
registrant to challenge a determination by his local board only after he actually re-
ported for induction. See Layton and Fine, supra note 13, at 316-17.
14. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 377 (1955), where the Court stated:
There is no direct judicial review of the actions of Appeal Boards.
Questions concerning the classification of the registrant may be raised
either in a petition for habeas corpus or as a defense to prosecution for
failure to submit to induction into the armed forces.
15. See United States v. Bellmer, 404 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1968), where plaintiff suffered
a denial of basic procedural fairness; United States v. Tichenor, 403 F.2d 986 (6th
Cir. 1968), where it was decided that a classification based on an erroneous view of
law falls within the purview of judicial review; Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376
(6th Cir. 1956), where a local board ignored its own regulations and denied procedural
rights; Schwartz v. Strauss, 206 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1953), where although the
plaintiff's suit was denied on the grounds of no jurisdiction, Judge Frank in the
concurring opinion stated that judicial relief should be available immediately where
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abused its discretion. The test of "exhaustion of all administrative
remedies" prior to review was temporarily set aside upon a showing of
"imminent danger of irreparable harm." 'o After the application of first
and fourteenth amendment rights to other federal agencies had been
established, 17 judicial review was available when statutes patently abridg-
ing free expression were challenged.' Yet, prior to Wolff v. Selective
Service System'9 review of local board decisions was available only after
a registrant had responded to an order to report for induction.2°
Wolff provided a new basis for judicial review. Where irreparable
injury to an individual's rights was likely to result, the test of justicia-
bility and ripeness of controversy would apply.2' Under extremely
narrow circumstances, one federal court departed from a long-
"the Board's lack of jurisdiction is manifest." See also Sicurella v. United States,
348 U.S. 385 (1955); McCoy v. United States, 403 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1968); Glover v.
United States, 286 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961); Batterson v. United States, 260 F.2d 233
(8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Close, 215 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1954).
16. In Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952), the court ignored the
exhaustion of remedies doctrine where a medical student was classified as delinquent
for failure to report for a physical examination as scheduled. The court found the
local board's action to be without any basis in fact and contrary to regulations. Id. at
143. The majority recognized the registrants dilemma and stated:
On such a strong showing, this Court does not feel justified in com-
pelling the registrant either to undergo the ignominy of a criminal prose-
cution, with the consequent possible destruction of his medical career,
or to submit himself to induction amid the notoriety and humiliating
and defamatory comment inevitably spewed forth in a situation of this
kind. Id. at 145.
See also Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Ci. 1968).
17. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965); United States v. Wood, 295
F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962). See also Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114, 126 (1946), where Justice Murphy stated in a concurring
opinion:
Before a person may be punished for violating an administrative order
due process of law requires that the order be within the authority of
the administrative agency and that it not be issued in such a way as
to deprive the person of his constitutional rights.
18. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,489-90 (1965).
19. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
20. See Layton and Fine, supra note 13, at 328.
21. Reclassification in Wolff was held to have the effect of an immediate curtail-
ment of first amendment rights, thus creating a justiciable controversy. 20 ALA. L.
REv. 130 (1967). See also Wolff v. Selective Serv. Sys., 372 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1967).
The court found nothing in the exhaustion or jurisdiction precedents to prevent
judicial intervention where immediate deprivation of first amendment rights was
clearly presented.
22. 372 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1967). The court created an exception to case law
in order to prevent local boards from hindering the exercise of free speech. Judicial
19691
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established policy of non-intervention in Selective Service affairs and
granted pre-induction review of a classification at the local board
level. Under similarly narrow circumstances courts could now review
a challenged classification irrespective of the stage in the administrative
process at which the action was brought.
The rationale of the Court in Oestereicb, in extending pre-induction
judicial review to those cases where there is a clear denial of a registrant's
statutory rights,4 recognizes that a local board cannot ignore what
Congress has granted as a valid exemption from service, and cannot de-
prive a registrant of his liberty without the prior opportunity of
presenting his claim to a competent forum. 5 Whether or not the scope
of this decision is to be limited to the narrow circumstances of the
principal case is yet to be determined.2 6 Where local boards proceed
in blatant disregard of their jurisdiction, the courts can exercise direct
review of that action.2 7 Where the local boards act within their
statutory authority, the trend seems to be against any further extension
of review. However, in light of an increasing number of classification
review is justified only when the local board's action unconstitutionally impairs first
amendment rights.
23. In cases involving infringement of constitutional rights, registrants should be
permitted to challenge their classifications immediately. 31 ALBANY L. REv. 349, 355
(1967). The registrant does not have to face a criminal prosecution or court martial
before he may challenge the board's decision, at least where first amendment rights
are involved.
24. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 89 S. Ct. 414, 416 (1968).
25. Id. at 416-17. See also Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
26. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 89 S. Ct. 414, 417 n.7 (1968). The circum-
stances of the prinicpal case involved a clear statutory exemption granted by Congress.
where no question or determination of fact was required. The Court itself, in noting
the unique circumstances of the present controversy, gave an indication as to the
true import and possible extension of this decision:
We would have a somewhat different problem were the contest over, say,
the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a Board's classification. Then
we would not be able to say that it was plain on the record and on the
face of the Act that an exemption had been granted and there would
therefore be no clash between § 10 (b) (3) and another explicit provision
of the Act.
27. Id. at 416-17.
28. See Clark v. Gabriel, 89 S. Ct. 424 (1968), an opinion which was handed down
the same day as Oestereich, but in which pre-induction judicial review was not
granted where a local board denied a registrants application for classification as a
conscientious objector. The Court upheld § 10(b) (3) in stating that judicial review
of a classification was precluded except as a defense to a criminal prosecution.
For recent decisions adhering to the "basis in fact" test in supporting local board
classifications and denying review, see McCoy v. United States, 403 F.2d 896 (5th Cir.
1968); Matyastik v. United States, 392 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1968); Jones v. United States,
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cases, the scope of the "clear conflict" test is a question which will be
presented in the future.
MICHAEL E. KRIS
Federal Taxation-PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION-CORPORAT
v. PARTNERSHIP STATUS. Empey v. United States, - F. 2d - (10th
Cir. 1969).
During the first ten months of 1965, Empey was a lawyer-employee
of a professional service organization.' On November 1 of that year he
became a ten percent shareholder. In his federal income tax return for
1965 he reported the salary he received for the first ten months, and
in addition reported ten percent of the net income of the organization
for November and December although he actually received no part of
such income. This was done in the apparent belief that the organization
was taxable as a partnership. Later, contending that the organization
should be taxed as a corporation rather than as a partnership, Empey
filed a timely claim for refund of the tax paid by him on the difference
between his salary and his share of the corporate net earnings for No-
vember and December. Through inaction, the Internal Revenue Service
rejected the claim, thereby tacitly ruling that under Treasury regula-
tions the professional service corporation was a partnership for pur-
poses of taxation. Empey brought suit in the federal district court3 to
387 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Carey v. Local Bd., Civil No. 12,966 (D. Conn.,
filed Feb. 13, 1969) where pre-induction judicial review was granted. The require-
ments for review established in the Oestereicb decision were invoked to grant regis-
trant's petition for classification.
1. The corporation was organized under the Colorado Corporation Code. CoLO. REv.
STAT. AN. ch. 31, art. 1-10 (1963). Lawyers had been permitted to so organize by a
1961 special ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court. Coo R. Crv. P. 265.
2. Professional service corporations and associations, organized under local statutes,
vary in their characteristics from state to state. Normally, this type of organization
falls somewhere between a corporation and a partnership depending upon the
possession or non-possession of corporate attributes.
One such attribute, that of continuity of existence, is found in most professional
corporations but is restricted by the requirement that shareholders be members of the
profession practiced by the organization, e.g. medicine or law. Many states require
that the stockholder also be an employee. Dissolution and reformation of the enter-
prise are not necessary after the death or departure of a shareholder, however, as is
often the case with a partnership.
Centralization of management is a characteristic found in varying degrees among
partnerships as well as corporations and professional associations. Of course, the man-
